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Transfer fees ('flip taxes') on the sale of cooperative housing
units must be expressly permitted by the tenant-shareholder's
proprietary lease or the cooperative's by-laws, but may be as-
sessed on a basis that does not treat all shareholders alike.
In New York, cooperative housing corporations are organized
pursuant to the Business Corporation Law1 and managed by a
board of directors elected by the tenant-shareholders.2 Courts have
frequently upheld various restrictions and fees imposed by such
boards on tenant-shareholders as valid exercises of business judg-
ment discretion3 pursuant to the certificate of incorporation, by-
' While cooperative housing may be organized in several ways, New York cooperatives
are almost exclusively formed as corporations. 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.0111], at 2-2.1 (1982). Other
methods of cooperative formation include the trust form, and various types of co-ownership,
including joint tenancy, tenancy in common, and a peculiar California tenancy-in-common
cooperative. Id. See generally 4B R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 633.2-633.4
(1985) (creation requirements for cooperative corporation); Note, Legal Characterization of
the Individual's Interest in Cooperative Apartment: Realty or Personalty?, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 250 (1973) (discussing characteristics of cooperative corporation); Comment, A Survey
of the Legal Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 305 (1961)
(review of legal structures available for cooperative organization). Most New York coopera-
tive housing corporations are formed as ordinary business corporations pursuant to the Bus-
iness Corporation Law. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 402-403 (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1986). However, a cooperative housing unit may be organized pursuant to the Cooperative
Corporations Law. See N.Y. CooP. CORP. LAW §§ 11, 13-14 (McKinney 1951 & Supp. 1986);
P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra, § 3.02, at 3-5 (while the Cooperative Corporations Law is
"primarily for agriculture cooperatives, housing cooperatives come within its purview").
Corporations formed pursuant to the Cooperative Corporations Law are subject to the pro-
visions of the Business Corporation Law unless expressly displaced by a provision of the
Cooperative Corporations Law. See N.Y. CooP. CORP. LAW § 5(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
2 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986) ("corporation shall be man-
aged under the direction of its board of directors"). See also Vernon Manor Coop Apart-
ments v. Salatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 495, 178 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (Westchester County Ct.
1958) (board's purpose is to house its members "in a comfortable and efficient manner");
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 703 (McKinney 1963). Directors are elected at each annual meeting
of shareholders, see id., by a plurality of the votes cast at that meeting. See id. at § 614.
Pursuant to the business judgment doctrine, boards of directors have imposed numer-
ous restrictions, conditions and fees upon shareholder-tenants that have been upheld by the
courts.
3 See, e.g., Pardy v. Fountainhead Owners Corp., N.Y.L. J., Oct. 2, 1985, at 14, col. 5
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1985) (board could refuse sale to woman with small child);
Garrison Apartments, Inc. v. Sabourin, 113 Misc. 2d 674, 679, 449 N.Y.S.2d 629, 633 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (security patrol fee held valid exercise of board's business judg-
ment). Hilltop Village Coop. No. 4 v. Wolman, 13 Misc. 2d 753, 754, 178 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1957) (board resolution requiring tenants with washing machines
to pay monthly fee not "arbitrary or otherwise illegal"); Forest Park Coop. v. Hellman, 2
Misc. 2d 183, 184, 152 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1956) (board's ban on
washing machines in individual apartments held valid act of managerial discretion).
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laws and proprietary lease.4 However, the imposition of a transfer
fee commonly known as a "flip tax", -payable by the shareholder to
the cooperative corporation before a sale, transfer or assignment of
the shareholders' corporate interest is approved by the board, 5 has
Managerial and policy decisions that serve to further legitimate corporate purposes are
generally considered to be a valid exercise of board discretion pursuant to the business judg-
ment doctrine, which "bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good
faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of
corporate purposes." Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979). By invoking the business judgment doctrine, cooperative boards
may legally require shareholders to obtain board consent before selling their ownership in-
terest, unless such refusal is violative of civil rights legislation. See Weisner v. 791 Park Ave.
Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 434, 160 N.E.2d 720, 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70, 75 (1959) (coop owners
entitled to select their co-owners and neighbors, absent decision making based on race,
color, religion or nation origin).
Provisions in the by-laws and proprietary leases which afford the cooperative corpora-
tion a right of first refusal over share transfers have also been upheld as valid exercises of
board discretion. See, e.g., Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 App. Div.
685, 691-92, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417, 422 (1st Dep't 1939) (coop corporation's right of first refusal
not violative of alienation doctrine).
4 The legal rights and relationships which comprise the cooperative corporation are cre-
ated by the certificate of incorporation, the corporate by-laws and the proprietary lease. P.
ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 1, § 2.01[4][b], at 2-8. The certificate of incorporation is
filed with the Secretary of State and contains, inter alia, the purposes of the corporation.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986). The by-laws define and limit the
conduct and business of the corporation and "the rights or powers of its shareholders, direc-
tors or officers . . ." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 601(c) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986).
The New York Real Property Law defines a proprietary lease as "a lease to, or held by,
a tenant entitled thereto by reason of ownership of stock in a corporate owner of premises
which operates the same on a cooperative basis." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b(3) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1986). A proprietary lease embodies the attributes of ownership, affording the
tenant-shareholder rights and privileges in a tenancy not normally accruing in a typical
landlord-tenant relationship. See W. EVERETT, THE PURCHASER'S APPROACH TO COOPERATIVE
APARTMENTS IN COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS 29 (2d ed. 1961). Thus, the certificate of incorpo-
ration, by-laws and proprietary lease, read together, determine the respective rights and
duties of the board and shareholders. See State Tax Comm'n v. Shor, 43 N.Y.2d 151, 157,
371 N.E.2d 523, 526, 400 N.Y.S.2d 805, 808 (1977) ("[n]either the stock certificate nor the
lease... can appropriately be viewed or valued in isolation from the other"); Vernon Manor
Coop Apartments v. Salatino, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 494, 178 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (Westchester
County Ct. 1958) (relationship between coop and owner "is embodied in the certificate of
incorporation, the by-laws [sic], the rules and regulations, and the member contracts"). Cf.
Brennan v. Breezy Point Coop., 63 N.Y.2d 1022, 1025, 473 N.E.2d 738, 740, 484 N.Y.S.2d
510, 512 (1984) (authority of board contained in certificate of incorporation, by-laws, propri-
etary lease and prospectus).
' See P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 1, § 2.01[5][c][i][A], at 2-12.19. The tenant-
shareholders benefit from the imposition of flip taxes since these fees may be used as a
source of reserve funds for capital improvements, as a method of keeping monthly mainte-
nance down and as a means of reducing the need for special assessments. Siegler, Coopera-
tive Housing: Validity of Board-Imposed Resale Fees, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1984, at 1, col. 3.
The transfer fee may also serve to discourage speculative buying, since tenant-shareholders
tend to be more concerned with the condition of the building because of their vested inter-
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generated considerable controversy. Courts considering the validity
of flip taxes imposed by boards of directors without shareholder
approval have reached contrary conclusions.6 Recently, in Fe
Bland v. Two Trees Management Co.,7 the New York Court of Ap-
est. See id. See also Mayerson v. 3701 Tenants Corp., 123 Misc. 2d 235, 235, 473 N.Y.S.2d
123, 124 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) (flip tax encourages tenant stability); D. CLURMAN, F.
JACKSON & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 92 (2d ed. 1984) (transfer fee may
reduce speculative purchases). Thus, proponents of transfer fees argue that the building will
be more attractive to prospective purchasers since maintenance costs and special assess-
ments have been kept to a minimum, while the corporation has been financially able to
make necessary capital improvements. See Berglund v. 411 East 57th Corp., 122 Misc. 2d
702, 705, 471 N.Y.S.2d 803, 806 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), rev'd per curiam, 127
Misc. 2d 58, 488 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1985), aff'd, 118 App. Div. 2d 431,
499 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1st Dep't 1986).
Transfer fees also discourage speculative purchasers due to tax implications. To qualify
for favorable tax treatment, the Internal Revenue Code requires that at least eighty percent
(80%) of the cooperative's income be "derived from tenant-stockholders" who reside in the
building; an excessive number of non-resident speculative owners could, therefore, jeopard-
ize the tax status of the corporation. See I.R.C. § 216(b)(1)(D) (1985). See also Kremnitzer,
Allocating Shares in Cooperative Under Internal Revenue Code, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 9, 1985, at 1,
col. 3 (implications of section 216).
Opponents of the transfer fee argue that it places an inequitable confiscatory burden on
the seller, since it is imposed only on a special class, namely persons selling their shares. See
Siegler, supra, at 1, cols. 3-4. Further, it is unfair to tenants in a conversion situation who
are forced to sell soon after acquisition, since the flip tax may impose financial burdens on
the seller. See id. The fee also adversely affects the shareholder's investment and equity
structure. See 330 West End Apartment Corp. v. Kelly, 124 Misc. 2d 870, 874, 478 N.Y.S.2d
220, 223 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), aff'd, 108 App. Div. 2d 1107, 486 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1st
Dep't 1985), aff'd sub nom., Fe Bland v. Two Trees Management Co., 66 N.Y.2d 556, 489
N.E.2d 223, 498 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1985).
6 In a number of cases, resale fees have been declared invalid because the fee was im-
properly imposed retroactively, or proper shareholder approval was not obtained by the
board. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Royal Summit Owners, Inc., 126 Misc. 2d 930, 932, 487
N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1984) (flip tax approved by shareholders
retroactively); Nantista v. 130 West 86 Apartments Corp. 130 Misc. 2d 635, 637, 496
N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1985) (fee approved by shareholders after
contract for sale entered into by owner); Jackson v. 239 Central Park West Corp., N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 27, 1984, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) (flip tax not approved by sharehold-
ers); Wallach v. 239 Central West Corp., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1984, at 7, col. 2 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1984) (flip tax imposed without shareholder approval); Other courts have in-
validated flip taxes because of the manner in which the fee was determined. See, e.g.,
Frymer v. Bell, 99 App. Div. 2d 91, 92, 472 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (1st Dep't 1984) (fee based on
market value held invalid); Mullins v. 510 East 86th Street Owners, Inc., 126 Misc. 2d 758,
759, 483 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) (transfer fee imposed failed
to meet proportionality requirements).
Several courts have upheld the validity of flip taxes as a valid excercise of board discre-
tion under the business judgment doctrine. See Mayerson v. 3701 Tenants Corp., 123 Misc.
2d 235, 473 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984); Tisch v. Park East Property, Inc.,
No. M-2037 (App. Div. 1st Dep't July 31, 1986); Reifman v. Berkeley Coop. Section III
Corp., No. 63890/74, slip op. at 2 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 31, 1975).
" 66 N.Y.2d. 556, 489 N.E.2d. 223, 498 N.Y.S.2d. 336 (1985).
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peals held that the imposition of a valid transfer fee required
shareholder approval, evidenced by a combined reading of all rele-
vant documents-the certificate of incorporation, the by-laws and
the proprietary lease-and that any such flip tax must be propor-
tional to share ownership." However, subsequent to this decision,
the New York legislature amended the relevant section of the New
York Business Corporation Law, thus allowing the imposition of
transfer fees that are not proportional to share ownership.'
Fe Bland v. Two Trees Management Co.
In Fe Bland, the Court of Appeals affirmed Fe Bland v. Two
Trees Management Co.,'0 and modified and affirmed 330 West
End Apartment Corp. v. Kelly,I1 invalidating a flip tax imposed by
the board of directors on shareholders at the time of resale in both
cases.' 2 In Fe Bland, the plaintiff, a former shareholder-tenant,
sought to recover a $39,000 flip tax imposed by the defendant co-
8 Id. at 563, 565, 489 N.E.2d at 225-27, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 340-41.
9 On July 24, 1986, an amendment to § 501(c) of the New York Business Corporation
Law was signed into law by Governor Cuomo. The amendment reads as follows:
(c) Subject to the designations, relative rights, preferences and limitations ap-
plicable to separate series, each share shall be equal to every other share of the
same class. With respect to corporations owning or leasing residential premises
and operating the same on a cooperative basis, however, provided that mainte-
nance charges, general assessments pursuant to a proprietary lease, and voting,
liquidation or other distribution rights are substantially equal per share, shares of
the same class shall not be considered unequal because of variations in fees or
charges payable to the corporation upon sale or transfer of shares and appurte-
nant proprietary leases that are provided for in proprietary leases, occupancy
agreements or offering plans or properly approved amendments to the foregoing
instruments.
§ 2. This act shall take effect immediately and shall be deemed to apply to
shareholders of cooperative apartment corporations from and after the date of ex-
ecution of the proprietary leases and occupancy agreements executed before the
effective date of this act.
Ch. 598 §§ 1, 2 [1986] N.Y. Laws 1284 (McKinney) (to be codified at N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
501(c)). The amendment appears to have been a legislative reaction to the Fe Bland deci-
sion. See Siegler, Business Corporation Law Change Accomodates Co-Op Flip Taxes,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 3 (enactment eliminates limitations on permissible flip taxes
mandated by Fe Bland decision).
10 125 Misc. 2d 111, 479 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), aff'd, 109 App. Div.
2d 1110, 487 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1st Dep't 1985), afl'd, 66 N.Y.2d 556, 489 N.E.2d 223, 498
N.Y.S.2d 336 (1985).
11 124 Misc. 2d 870, 478 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), afi'd, 108 App. Div.
2d 1107, 486 N.Y.S.2d 586 (lst Dep't 1985), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 556, 489 N.E.2d 223, 498
N.Y.S.2d 336 (1985).
2 Fe Bland, 66 N.Y.2d at 559-60, 489 N.E.2d at 227, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
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operative corporation when the tenant assigned his lease and stock
to an outside purchaser.' 3 The transfer fee was imposed on the sale
retroactively, pursuant to a board resolution passed after the
plaintiff had contracted to sell his shares, but prior to the closing. 14
The flip tax was never approved by the shareholders" and was a
per share resale fee with differing rates depending upon (1)
whether the shareholder was an original subscriber or an outside
purchaser and (2) the length of time the shareholder owned his
stock.' 6 However, Fe Bland's proprietary lease provided only for
fees related to the actual costs incurred by the cooperative in
processing a sale, assignment or transfer. 7 The Supreme Court,
Special Term, held that the transfer fee was an unauthorized exer-
cise of the board's power, and that the tax was discriminatory
since all shareholders of the same class were not treated equally, as
required by section 501(c) of the Business Corporation Law.'8 On
appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed without
opinion.19
In 330 West End Apartment Corp. v. Kelly,20 the plaintiff cor-
Id. at 560-61, 489 N.E.2d at 227, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
,4 Id. Fe Bland was an original subscriber in the building when it was converted in
1980, acquiring 195 shares and the proprietary lease to his apartment for $112,125. Id. at
560, 489 N.E.2d at 225, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 338. Pursuant to a resolution passed by the share-
holders at the 1981 annual meeting, the board of directors amended the by-laws on Oct. 6,
1981 to provide for a flip tax of $2,500 per apartment. Id. On October 5, 1983, Fe Bland
contracted with a buyer for the assignment of his stock and proprietary lease for $550,000.
Id. On November 1, 1983, however, two weeks prior to the closing, the board of directors,
without shareholder approval, amended the original flip tax resolution. Id.
5 Id. at 560-61, 489 N.E.2d at 225, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
16 Id., 489 N.E.2d at 225, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 338. The amendment required a shareholder
to pay a per share fee in order to obtain board approval for a sale or assignment that varied
"from $50 to $200 per share depending upon whether the [shareholder-seller] was an origi-
nal purchaser... or an outsider and whether he had been an owner for five years or more."
Id. (footnote omitted).
1 Id. at 564, 489 N.E.2d at 229, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 341. Fe Bland was forced to pay a
$39,000 transfer fee and sign "a general release in favor of the" defendants. Id. at 561, 489
N.E.2d at 221, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
,8 See Fe Bland, 125 Misc. 2d at 116, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 127. The trial court held that the
board's resolution of November 1, 1983 violated "the proportionality requirements of the
certificate of incorporation" and section 501(c) of the and Business Corporation Law . Id. at
116, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 127; see also supra note 9 (discussion of 501(c)). The trial court also
found that the proprietary lease did not authorize a flip tax and that the fee violated the
proprietary lease's cash requirements provision. Fe Bland, 125 Misc.2d at 115, 479 N.Y.S.2d
at 126.
Fe Bland, 109 App. Div. 2d 1110, 487 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1st Dep't 1985).
20 124 Misc. 2d 870, 478 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), affd 108 App. Div.
2d 1107, 486 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1st Dep't 1985), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 556, 489 N.E.2d 223, 498
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
poration sought a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a
$6,300 flip tax charged to the defendant-shareholder when he sold
his stock and assigned his proprietary lease to a third party.2 The
flip tax, set at two percent of the gross sales price, was imposed
pursuant to a board resolution that was never approved by the
shareholders.22 Special Term held that the fee imposition was
within the board's scope of authority under the business judgment
doctrine but awarded the defendant summary judgment because
the flip tax was not authorized by the shareholders proprietary
lease.23 On appeal the Appellate Division, First Department, af-
firmed without opinion. 4
The Court of Appeals addressed several major issues in decid-
ing the two cases. Writing for the court, Judge Meyer stated that
the legal relationship between a cooperative housing corporation
and its tenant-shareholders is a product of all relevant corporate
documents (the by-laws and the certificate of incorporation), the
proprietary lease and the applicable statutory and decisional law.25
After concluding that the relevant provisions of the leases and by-
laws in both cases were almost identical,26 the court held that,
when read together, these documents merely permitted each corpo-
ration to assess fees directly related to the actual costs incurred by
the corporation in transferring the stock and the leases.' 7 Thus, the
N.Y.S.2d 336 (1985).
21 Fe Bland, 66 N.Y.2d at 562, 489 N.E.2d at 226, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 339. The defendant
counterclaimed for the return of the fee, contending that the board had no authority to
impose a flip tax. Id., 489 N.E.2d at 226, 498 N.Y.2d at 339. Kelly, an original subscriber in
330 West End Apartment Corporation when it was formed in 1980, had purchased 2,700
shares of stock and the proprietary lease for $270,000. Id. He received $315,000 from the
purchaser of his apartment. Id.
22 Id.
23 See Kelly, 124 Misc. 2d at 873-74, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 223-24; See also supra note 3
(discussion of business judgment doctrine). The trial court held that while the board of
directors had the necessary authority to impose the fee under the by-laws pursuant to the
business judgment doctrine, the fee was not authorized by the proprietary lease because,
while the lease required the assignor to pay certain expenses, it did not authorize the impo-
sition of a flip tax; in addition, a three-fourths vote of the shareholders was required for any
modificaton of the lease. Kelly, 124 Misc. 2d at 873, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
24 Kelly, 108 App. Div. 2d 1107, 486 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1st Dep't 1985).
25 Fe Bland, 66 N.Y.2d at 563, 489 N.E.2d at 227, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
2 Id. at 563-65, 489 N.E.2d at 227-29, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 340-41.
27 Id. The by-laws in question provided for "reasonable fee[s] to cover actual expenses
and attorneys' fees of the [c]orporation, a service fee ... and such other conditions as [the
board] may determine, in connection with such proposed assignment." Id. at 563-64, 489
N.E.2d at 227, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 340 (emphasis added). The court concluded, contrary to the
corporation's contention, that the phrase "such other conditions" did not include monetary
1986]
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court concluded that the resolutions passed by the boards of direc-
tors in Fe Bland and Kelly had no effect on the proprietary leases
at issue, since these leases were part of the agreement between the
shareholders and the corporation and therefore required a share-
holder-approved amendment to implement a valid transfer fee.2 8
While the business judgment doctrine permits a board wide
latitude to impose fees and conditions upon tenant-shareholders in
furtherance of legitimate corporate purposes, 29 the court ruled that
a flip tax was beyond the board's inherent authority because it was
contrary to the express limitations and authority granted to the
board by the by-laws and proprietary lease.30 The court of appeals
found that the "cash requirements provision" of each lease re-
quired that any fees imposed upon shareholders had to be propor-
tional to the amount of the transferor's stock as compared to the
total shares issued and outstanding.31 Since the transfer fees were
not based upon the actual percentage of ownership, the court held
that the flip tax was invalid on this ground as well.3 2 Lastly, the
court concluded that section 501(c) of the Business Corporation
Law required any fees or conditions imposed upon shareholders to
be on a per share basis33 Since the transfer fee in Fe Bland was
not based solely upon the plaintiff's share ownership, the court
held that the board resolution violated the rule of equal treatment
for all shareholders owning the same class of stock. 4
assessments. Id. at 564, 489 N.E.2d at 227-28, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 340-41. The proprietary lease
authorized the collection of "reasonable legal and other expenses . . . in connection with
such assignment and transfer of shares," and limited the board's discretion to those fees and
conditions "specifically provided" for in the lease. Id. at 564, 489 N.E.2d at 227, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 341.
28 Id. at 563-66, 489 N.E.2d at 227-29, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 340-41.
29 Id. at 565, 489 N.E.2d at 228, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 341; see supra note 4.
30 Fe Bland, 66 N.Y. 2d at 565, 489 N.E.2d at 228, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
" Id. at 565-66, 489 N.E.2d at 228, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 341-42.
32 Id.
3- Id. at 566-69, 489 N.E.2d at 229-31, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 342-44. Cooperative corporations
normally have only one class of stock. This is required by the Internal Revenue Code section
216 as a prerequisite for tenant-stockholders to personally deduct their proportionate share
of the cooperative's expense deductions. Id. at 567, 489 N.E.2d at 229, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 342-
43; I.R.C. § 216(b)(1)(A) (1985). See also Kremnitzer, supra note 5, at 1, col. 3 (section 216
permits deduction by tenant-stockholder of interest and taxes).
M Fe Bland, 66 N.Y.2d at 566-69, 489 N.E.2d at 229-31, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 342-44. The
court found it unnecessary to decide whether the $2,500 flip tax passed by the shareholders
in Fe Bland was valid, since it was not in issue. Id. at 566-67, 489 N.E.2d at 229, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 342. However, the Court stated that such fee was invalid because it was on a per
apartment basis, and was, therefore, violative of section 501(c) of the Business Corporation
Law.
[Vol. 60:590
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The Fe Bland decision mandates that any transfer fees not
reasonably related to the expenses incurred by the cooperative in
transferring the shares to a purchaser must be provided for by a
combined reading of the certificate of incorporation, the by-laws
and the proprietary lease.3 5 Generally, these documents are stan-
dardized and permit only proportional fees and assessments, as did
the provisions in Fe Bland." It is submitted that express share-
holder approval would be required to amend both the by-laws and
proprietary lease in order to enact a legally enforceable flip tax be-
cause such a fee constitutes a material alteration in the relation-
ship between the shareholder and the corporation. 7 Moreover, the
fiduciary duty owed by the board of directors to the tenant-share-
holder necessitates shareholder approval of a flip tax since such a
fee does not bear a reasonable relationship to the express authority
of the board to enact measures which benefit all of the share-
Additionally, the Fe Bland court stated that the proprietary lease had a stricture
against retroactive assessments, and invalidated the flip tax on that ground as well. Id. at
566, 489 N.E.2d at 228, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 342. Even without such a clause in the lease, a
retroactive flip tax could not be legally imposed. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Royal Summit Own-
ers, Inc., 126 Misc. 2d 930, 933, 487 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1984)
("essence of the transaction" between buyer and seller was completed before retroactive flip
tax was enacted by board). Thus, subsequent shareholder approval will not constitute a
valid ratification of any amendments passed by the board and cannot relate back. See RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 82, 89 & comment b (1957) (material change of circum-
stances makes ratification voidable); H. REUSCHLEIN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP § 34, at 77 (1979) (changed circumstances will "preclude ratification").
-1 Fe Bland, 66 N.Y.2d at 563, 489 N.E.2d at 227, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 340. Shareholder
approval would, therefore, normally be required to amend the lease and by-laws (unless
provisions were made at the time of conversion in all the relevant documents). See id.
- See Clurman, Letters to the Editor, N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1984, at 2, col. 6 (almost all
proprietary leases have standardized provisions).
37 See 330 West End Apartment Corp. v. Kelly, 124 Misc. 2d 870, 873, 478 N.Y.S.2d
220, 223 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), aff'd, 108 App. Div. 2d 1107, 486 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1st
Dep't 1985), modified and aff'd sub nom. Fe Bland v. Two Trees Management Co., 66
N.Y.2d 556, 489 N.E.2d 223, 498 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1985) (board cannot "amend a material
contractual provision of the proprietary lease" without the required shareholder approval);
Fe Bland v. Two Trees Management Co., 125 Misc. 2d 111, 116-17, 479 N.Y.S.2d 123, 127
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), aff'd, 109 App. Div. 2d 1110, 487 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1st Dep't
1985), aff'd 66 N.Y.2d 556, 489 N.E.2d 223, 498 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1985) (flip tax represents
"material changes in the terms of the proprietary lease which the board lacks authority to
accomplish"); see also supra note 4 (discussing legal relationships created by coop docu-
ments).
11 See Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 494, 335 N.E.2d 334, 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122,
126-27 (1975) (board owes fiduciary duty to treat all shareholders equally and not "use their
position for their own personal advantage or for that of their confederates or to the detri-
ment of stockholders"); Fe Bland v. Two Trees Management Co., 125 Misc. 2d at 116, 479
N.Y.S.2d at 127 (board of directors has duty to treat all shareholders evenhandedly).
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RECENT AMENDMENT TO SECTION 501(C).
Fe Bland held, inter alia, that pursuant to section 501(c) of
the Business Corporation Law, all shareholders of the same class of
stock must be treated alike.40 While the decision stirred con-
troversy concerning the mechanics of a valid flip tax,4' many
questions have been resolved by a recent amendment to section
501(c). 42 The amendment expressly provides that cooperative
housing corporations may impose fees upon the "sale or transfer of
shares and appurtenant proprietary leases. . ." which are not pro-
portional to share ownership. The amended statute now provides
that flip taxes must be provided for in the relevant corporate docu-
ments.43 Further, the amended version of section 501(c) has retro-
active effect, thus validating flip taxes imposed prior to the date
the amendment was passed.44
It is submitted that the flip tax in Fe Bland, would still be
invalid under the new amendment since the flip taxes at issue vio-
lated the agreement between the cooperatives and shareholders.45
" See Fe Bland, 66 N.Y.2d at 563-65, 489 N.E.2d at 227-29, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 340-42
(fee beyond inherent authority of board's business judgment); supra note 3 (restrictions
which bear reasonable relationship to purpose for which corporation was formed); supra
note 4 (authority of board determined by by-laws, lease and certificate of incorporation).
4o Fe Bland, 66 N.Y.2d at 567-69, 489 N.E.2d at 229-31, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 342-41.
41 See Sadowsky, Court Clarifies the Law Regarding Co-op Flip Tax, N.Y.L.J., March
12, 1986, at 23, col. 1; Margolies & Weisberg, Flip Tax Decision Raises Complex Issues for
Co-ops, N.Y.L.J., March 12, 1986 at 29, col. 1; Brooks, Talking Flip Taxes-Decision Raises
Questions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1986, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 1.
42 See supra note 9 for the text of this amendment. Flip taxes have been based on a
variety of factors, including: a flat fee per apartment based upon the size of the apartment; a
flat fee per share; a flat percentage of the gross selling price of the cooperative unit; and a
percentage of profits derived from the sale. See Fe Bland, 125 Misc. 2d at 113 n.2, 479
N.Y.S.2d at 125 n.2; Siegler, Cooperative Housing: Validity of Board-Imposed Resale Fees,
N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1984, at 1, col. 3. It is suggested that under the new amendment to section
501(c) all of these formulas would be valid.
43 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 501(c) (McKinney Aug. 1986).
44 Id.; see supra note 9 for the text of this provision.
4' See, e.g., Siegler, Business Corporation Law Change Accomodates Co-Op Flip
Taxes, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 3, at 2, col. 6 (Fe Bland holding that requires share-
holder approval for valid flip tax not affected by new amendment); Brooks, Questions
Raised on Co-Op Law, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1986, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 1, at 12, cols. 1-
2 (effective flip tax must still be authorized in relevant documents).
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Furthermore, the recent amendment to section 501(c) does not
contravene, and perhaps implicitly codifies, the Fe Bland mandate
that a combined reading of all the relevant documents must permit
the imposition of a flip tax. Thus, shareholder approval of any flip
tax will still be required, and although the statute has retroactive
application, a transfer fee imposed without shareholder approval
prior to the date of the new legislation would be an invalid exercise
of corporate power.
Alexander Sokoloff
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 203(e): Plaintiff may assert an otherwise time-barred claim
against a third-party defendant if court in its discretion finds de-
fendant had notice of the claim and amended complaint relates
back to service of third-party complaint.
CPLR 203(e) allows a plaintiff, in amending a timely com-
plaint, to include an otherwise time-barred claim, provided the
original pleading has given sufficient notice of the transactions or
occurrences "to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading."1
CPLR 203(e) was enacted to overcome case law which prohibited
' See CPLR 203(e) (McKinney 1972). CPLR 203(e) provides:
A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at
the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original
pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transac-
tions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading.
Id. Section 203(e) was based on Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that an amendment may relate back only if the claim against the new party arose
out of the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" set forth in the original pleading and if the
party sought to be added knew or should have known of the institution of the suit. See 1
WK&M 203.29, at 2-118.16 (1986); The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 283, 284
(1966); The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 467, 467 (1967); see also M. GREEN,
BASIC Civa. PROCEDURE 135 (2d ed. 1979) (relation back theory underlying Rule 15(c)).
The practical effect of CPLR 203(e) was to necessitate that a defendant make a com-
prehensive, timely examination of all facts surrounding the transaction to anticipate poten-
tial claims which could be added later. See, e.g., Henegar v. Freudenheim, 40 App. Div. 2d
825, 826, 337 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (2d Dep't 1972) (amendment to assert lack of informed
consent permitted in medical malpractice action); Watso v. City of New York, 39 App. Div.
2d 960, 961, 333 N.Y.S.2d 492, 493 (2d Dep't 1972) (amendment of wrongful death com-
plaint to allege assault as well as negligence); see also, The Biannual Survey, 39 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 178, 184-85 (1964).
